




Glass-Steagall: Some Critical Reflections
Roberta S. Karmel
Brooklyn Law School, roberta.karmel@brooklaw.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/faculty
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Legislation Commons, Other Law
Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
97 Banking L. J. 631 (1980)
GLASS-STEAGALL: SOME CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
Roberta S. Karmel*
Much ink has been spilled on the Glass-Steagall Act,
ranging from passionate political rhetoric to arcane legal
analysis. In this dispassionate and lucid article, the au-
thor, a Commissioner of the SEC from September 1977
to February 1980, tells why the Glass-Steagall Act was
passed, why it is no longer working very well as a reg-
ulatory scheme, and why the policy decision to separate
commercial from investment banking is nevertheless
worth retaining.
Why Glass-Steagall Was Passed
The political climate in which the Glass-Steagall Act was
passed is probably best evoked by the words of Ferdinand
Pecora, who in 1933 and 1934 served as counsel to the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency in its investigation of
stock exchange, banking and securities markets practices. This
investigation led to the enactment of the federal securities laws,
as well as the Glass-Steagall Act. (Pecora immediately benefited
from these statutes by being appointed a Commissioner of the
newly created SEC.) In 1939, when the Depression was waning,
Pecora wrote a book to remind the public "'what Wall Street
was like before Uncle Sam stationed a policeman at its corner,
lest, in time to come, some attempt be made to abolish that
post." ,
What Pecora and the Senate Committee found was "a shock-
ing corruption in our banking system, a widespread repudiation
of old-fashioned standards of honesty and fair dealing in the
creation and sale of securities, and a merciless exploitation of
the vicious possibilities of intricate corporate chicanery." 2
* Partner, Rogers & Wells, New York, New York; Commissioner of the SEC from
September 1977 to February 1980. This article is based on the author's speech
delivered at the Conference on Regulating the Securities Activities of Commercial
Banks at the New York University Graduate School of Business Administration,
Oct. 12, 1979, and speaks as of that date.
1 Pecora, Wall Street Under Oath XI (1939).
2 Id. at 283.
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What Congress concluded was that commercial banks must
divorce themselves from their security affiliates. This was ac-
complished by the Glass-Steagall Act, which, in Pecora's words,
"decisively rescued commercial banking from its entanglement
with the extraneous business of security flotation and market
plunging." ' In the words of a more current observer of the fi-
nancial world: "In 1933, the Glass-Steagall Act forbade com-
mercial banks to own common stock or to underwrite and sell
stock or corporate bonds to their customers or depositors; and
the banks slowly, grumblingly, returned to banking." '
The reader may well ask: If the issue was so decisively re-
solved, why the current concern with regulating the securities
activities of commercial banks? The answer, of course, is that
the Glass-Steagall Act did not totally bar commercial banks
from the securities industry. Like so much New Deal legislation,
it was a reactive and pragmatic response to specified perceived
wrongs. The statute put restraints on certain banking activities,
rather than enunciating a broad, philosophical rationale for
dividing a formerly homogeneous financial community into two
subcultures. Since some of those restraints are on potentially
profitable activities, avoidance of the statutory restrictions has
been a challenge for bankers and their lawyers.
The Fundamental Regulatory Issues
The most popular political theme in regulatory circles today
is regulatory reform, and the Glass-Steagall Act is indeed suscep-
tible to attack under the banner of deregulation. It is easy to
argue that the law erects barriers to marketplace entry by firms
anxious to let competition, rather than a bunch of federal bu-
reaucracies, regulate the financial world. Further, half a century
has passed since the 1929 stock market crash and many solutions
of the Depression period have become the problems of our in-
flation-plagued economy. Nevertheless, before anyone becomes
overeager to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act, either in one fell
- Id. at 284.
4 Mayer, The Bankers 52 (1974).
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swoop or by piecemeal amendment, Congress and the public
need to consider what are the fundamental issues of national
policy in the regulation of our financial institutions. These issues
may be categorized as follows:
* What kind of regulation is necessary to insure investor
protection in securities transactions and the safety of cus-
tomer deposits and other property held by commercial
and investment banks?
* How much concentration of power and wealth by the na-
tion's financial institutions is appropriate and in the public
interest?
* To what extent and how should the federal government
direct and control the allocation of the nation's financial
resources?
* What conflicts of interest by financial fiduciaries should
be prohibited because they lead to abuses of trust which
impair confidence in the financial markets?
* Assuming that a national consensus can be reached on
any of the above issues, what kind of legislation will best
achieve the objectives of financial institution regulation?
Unfortunately, most of these problems are not even ad-
dressed, let alone solved, by the Glass-Steagall Act or the sug-
gestions for amending that law currently being debated.
The Particularities of Glass-Steagall
Regulatory ambiguities often occur because a law is written
in an unduly general style. When it comes to the separation of
investment and commercial banking, however, many ambiguities
can be blamed on a law which was written with great particular-
ity so as to address specific abuses which Congress believed led
to the Depression of the 1930s. However, both commercial and
investment banking are different industries today.
The foundation for the wall separating commercial and in-
vestment banking is Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act. This
provision differentiates what is permissible for commercial banks
from what is prohibited according to the character of the secu-
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rities involved, rather than by the activities or services that the
commercial banks would perform. That is, in some securities,
a commercial bank may act as an agent for the account of a
customer; in some securities, it may, subject to limitations and
restrictions, purchase for its own account; and in U.S. obliga-
tions and general obligation municipals, it may deal, under-
write, or invest. Probably the statute was drafted with such
particularity so as to be directed specifically at the abuses un-
covered by the Pecora Investigation. Those abuses occurred in
an era of booming equities markets. If banks had been involved
instead in REITs or futures contracts on financial instruments
when the "crash" came, the Glass-Steagall Act might have been
drafted very differenily.
Because the Glass-Steagall Act defines what activities are
appropriate for commercial banks by the securities involved in
a transaction, and because banks are not considered broker-
dealers under the securities laws, the statutes have resulted in
some anomalous regulation. Identical business activities per-
formed by different institutions are frequently subject to dis-
similar regulation. Also, regulation has been unable to effec-
tively keep pace with the changing characteristics of particular
securities and their markets.
Why Glass-Steagall Doesn't Work Today
Banks as Broker-Dealers
Let us turn to the problem of similar services being subject
to different regulation. This is a problem to which the SEC di-
rected its attention in its Report on Banks' Securities Activities
-commonly called the Bank Study. In 1975, Congress adopted
Section 1 la(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Ex-
change Act), directing the SEC to study the extent to which
banks maintain accounts on behalf of public customers for buy-
ing and selling publicly traded securities and whether the exclu-
sions of banks from the Exchange Act's definitions of "broker"
and "dealer" are consistent with the protection of investors and
the other purposes of that Act. In short, Congress asked whether
banks-which may effect agency transactions without restriction
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-should be subject to the same regulation in effecting those
transactions as the brokerage community.
The Bank Study identified a number of areas in which bank
services that are functionally equivalent to those of broker-
dealers did not appear to be subject to an entirely adequate
regulatory structure. But although recognizing the need for
uniformity in regulating similar securities activities, the Bank
Study proceeded on the assumption that Congress sought to
maintain, to the greatest extent possible, the regulation of bank
activities by the federal banking agencies. Accordingly, the
Commission recommended that the banking agencies enact and
enforce specific rules and regulations governing the conduct of
banks in their securities activities, that they upgrade their ex-
amination proceedings in respect to such activities, and that
they advise the Commission of actual or potential violations of
the federal securities laws that are uncovered in these examina-
tions. In addition, in order to resolve a subtle but significant
regulatory anomaly, the SEC recommended that the federal
banking agencies should be specifically mandated to act for the
protection of investors in addition to their existing statutory
obligations.
Although the Commission's recommendations were intro-
duced in a previous Congress by Senator Williams, no legislative
action has yet been taken upon them.' The federal banking
agencies, however, have adopted many-but certainly not all-
of the Commission's recommendations as part of their rules and
regulations.' Therefore, the disparity of regulation of similar
services has been somewhat diminished, although not eliminated.
But one continuing disparity that only Congress can remedy is
to place on the bank regulatory agencies investor protection
mandates in addition to their responsibilities to bank depositors.
Changing Composition of the Securities Markets
Another problem inherent in defining permissible banking
activities according to the kind of security being bought or sold
5 S.2131, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 22, 1977).
6 See, e.g., Federal Reserve System Regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 208.8(k).
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is that the composition of the securities markets has changed
since the 1930s. Municipal securities, which were a minor fi-
nancing medium during the Depression, subsequently became a
major factor in the marketplace. Although the securities laws
were amended to create the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board, the Glass-Steagall Act has remained the same. Sometimes
business reacts to marketplace changes by creating new arrange-
ments to avoid the impact of a regulatory scheme. For example,
major banks reportedly are interested in distributing presold
principal revenue bonds in private placements in what they
assert to be an agency capacity.'
New Securities Products
The regulatory lag caused by defining permissible activities
according to the securities involved in a particular transaction
is most obvious when new securities products are created. Such
products raise hard questions as to statutory coverage because
congressional intent is realistically nonexistent. In this connec-
tion, questions being raised concerning the continuing viability
of the Glass-Steagall Act are due as much to the new business
activities of investment bankers as to the alleged encroachment
of the banking industry upon the traditional business of the
securities industry.
New products being offered by the securities industry have
led to complaints about encroachment by the banking industry.
The use of margin security credit as a source of capital for mak-
ing commercial loans to margin account customers, particularly
when such funds can be accessed with a bank credit card, is
receiving increasing attention. When such a program is com-
bined with a money-market fund, the banking community has
been claiming that brokers are effectively engaged in deposit
banking.'
Money-market funds are another successful new product
which seem to have eluded the categories established by the
Glass-Steagall Act. Yet the largest of such funds now has almost
7 Securities Week 1 (Sept. 10, 1979).
8 Rustin, "Want New Skis? Charge Them to Margin Account," Wall Street Jour-
nal, June 30, 1977, p. 12.
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$7 billion in assets.' Recently, the size of the money market
industry in one month alone increased over $3 billion."o When
such funds have check redemption privileges as low as $250,
the distinction between them and NOW (negotiable order with-
drawal) accounts is tenuous.
Because bankers and brokers are eager to provide similar
services, and because new securities and services have been
created which were not contemplated or imagined by Congress
in 1933, it is not surprising that both sides are willing to pur-
sue the possibility of profitable business in derogation of the
principles of the Glass-Steagall Act. Further, it is not surprising
that bankers and brokers each invoke the shield of the Glass-
Steagall Act to claim unfair competition.
But the Glass-Steagall Act was not intended to be a shield
against competition for any segment of the financial world. In
punitively splitting the financial world into commercial banking
and investment banking segments, Congress was not concerned
about protecting either industry from the competition of the
other. Rather, Congress intended to protect the public and the
American economy against the banking abuses uncovered by
Ferdinand Pecora. However, if the separation of commercial
and investment banking is to be reaffirmed today, it should be
because there is an ongoing need for such protection, or because
there are new public needs that have arisen as a result of changes
in the financial industry. As Brandeis warned years ago-fi-
duciaries should not be allowed to put other people's money at
risk for their personal gain.' The financial health of both com-
mercial banking and investment banking is, indeed, a proper
subject for concern by the federal government.
What Is the Proper Legislative Solution?
The goals of the Glass-Steagall Act may not be the appropri-
ate current rationale for the continued separation of investment
9 Wall Street Letter, Aug. 20, 1979, p. 6.
10 "Money Market Fund Sales Set a Record Again in August," Wall Street Jour-
nal, Sept. 26, 1979, p. 36.
11 Brandeis, Other Peoples' Money (1914).
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and commercial banking. Also questionable is whether that
separation can continue to be accomplished by a statute which
speaks in terms of particular transactions in specified securities
rather than generally prohibiting economic activities or potential
conflicts that are of governmental concern. Thus, the optimum
resolution of the policies at stake is not the determination, on a
case-by-case basis, of narrow legal issues, such as whether banks
are acting as agents in privately placing revenue bonds, but the
creation of a new legislative overview of the financial world
which is relevant to today's challenges. Such an overview may
well show that the abuses of the 1920s-and, in fact, the new
abuses that have arisen as a result of changing products and
markets-still require a segregation of functions. But if contin-
ued, the segregation of functions should be founded on a new
legislative determination of the potential harms inherent in ex-
isting practices and not on what is increasingly becoming the
semantical characterization of securities and the agency-principal
dichotomy.
The Need for Greater Safeguards
Let us return to the five issues previously set forth as funda-
mental to the regulation of our financial institutions and ask how
well the Glass-Steagall Act is addressing these problems. As to
the safety of customer deposits and other property held by banks,
the Glass-Steagall Act seems to have worked reasonably well
with regard to commercial banks, but the Act did not address
the financial safeguards appropriate for investment banks. The
risks posed to commercial banks by speculative securities in-
vestments not prohibited by the Glass-Steagall Act (e.g., REITs,
Ginnie Mae forwards, and short-term municipal bonds) would
indicate a need for more, rather than less, rigorous prohibitions
upon principal securities investments. The need for greater safe-
guards for the protection of customer property held by invest-
ment banks became apparent during the late 1960s and led to
the enactment of the Securities Investment Protection Act of
1970.
At the same time, the low level of capital information in the
nation's economy could lead to a policy of encouraging greater
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risk taking by our financial institutions. Their regulatory capital
might best be utilized in equity investment.
Antitrust Considerations
In a variety of laws, Americans have traditionally demon-
strated an aversion to the concentration of economic and politi-
cal power by banks. It probably can be argued that the separa-
tion of commercial and investment banking mandated by the
Glass-Steagall Act has proven a better regulator than the anti-
trust and other laws for curbing the excessive aggregation of
banking power in only a few financial institutions.
Regulation of the securities industry must necessarily be
concerned about the impact upon that industry which would be
caused by the expansion of the securities activities of commer-
cial banks (e.g., bank entry into the revenue bond market)-
the public will not be well served by a further contraction and
concentration of the securities industry. On the other hand,
it hardly seems appropriate for the separate financial regulatory
agencies to react to proposed regulatory changes by trying to
protect their own jurisdictions. But if banks are permitted
greater latitude in combining commercial and investment bank-
ing, some consolidation of supervisory regulatory agencies would
probably be required for proper oversight. In short, antitrust-
type considerations are among the most important, but also the
most difficult, of resolutions and they only lurk in rather inchoate
form in the Glass-Steagall Act.
The role of the federal government in allocating the nation's
financial resources is addressed by the federal banking and se-
curities laws. However, the specific prohibitions of the Glass-
Steagall Act, and its failure to keep pace with marketplace de-
velopments, have permitted considerable disintermediation in
the money markets. Moreover, the extent to which the growth
of money-market funds has undermined Regulation 0, for ex-
ample, is an important but unanswered question. However, the
tax laws probably are a bigger factor in determining how na-




The prohibition of conflicts of interest perceived by Con-
gress as improper is basic to the Glass-Steagall Act. Functional
segregation of investment and commercial banking is a respec-
table regulatory mechanism for preventing conflicts of interest.
Although in other areas federal law has resolved conflicts of
interest by disclosure, the elimination of possible conflict situa-
tions is obviously more effective.
Conclusion
Updating and forming a new national consensus on the
separation of commercial and investment banking will not be
easy. The answers to the real policy problems posed are not
obvious. Yet the mechanism by which the Glass-Steagall Act
enforces such a separation is not in the best working order. If
the basic objectives of the statute are not reexamined, and then
either reaffirmed or rejected, commercial banks are likely to be-
come more and more involved in securities activities and invest-
ment banks are likely to become more and more involved in
encouraging their customers, among other things, to invest
in money-market instruments outside commercial banking
channels.
Our nation's financial institutions are too important to be
permitted to drift in the absence of effective policy at the federal
government level. It is fashionable today to say that the market-
place is the best regulator of economic activity, but one wonders.
The objective of the marketplace is not to benefit the general
welfare but rather individual participants. Further, maximizing
economic efficiency is only one of many objectives of govern-
mental regulation. Today, when the public distrusts government
and business, failure of federal regulation to effectively control
and direct financial institution resources for the public interest
will further reduce public confidence in the economy.
The Glass-Steagall Act and related New Deal banking and
securities legislation were the product of political groups which
feared bigness generally and were particularly fearful of Wall
Street domination of the economy." Today, when the financial
12 Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal 439-440 (1959).
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markets are international, and many Americans are more con-
cerned about the threat of the universal foreign banks than the
Wall Street banks, a reexamination of the historically specific
and provincial legislation of Roosevelt's hundred days is appro-
priate, even if only to reaffirm the political and economic judg-
ments then made.
Improving the Corporate Facade
"We all know how the tax laws have set off their vigorous little
race between corporations trying to think up nontaxable perks for
their executives and IRS meanies trying to stop them. At least one
physician reports that there's a new ploy on the horizon. Corpo-
rations are sending executives-and their wives-to have face-lifts,
and picking up the bills. 'Why not?' asks the plastic surgeon. 'It's
unique, expensive, and tax deductible as a medical expense.' And
in the tough world of business, every little advantage counts.
"We wonder what other socially desirable habits the present
incentive structure will be inducing in our business classes."
-Wall Street Journal
March 28, 1980
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